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Structural change is taking place in Africa at a pace and with a pattern distinct 
from the historical experience of today’s industrialized countries. These 
differences reflect technological change, a changing global marketplace 
interacting with policy, a rapidly growing labour force and natural endowments. 
Some African countries, perhaps with coastal locations, will be able to transform 
their economic structures through manufacturing. However, it would be 
surprising if the successful African economy of the future closely followed the 
export-oriented manufacturing-led path that characterized East Asia’s structural 
transformation. Africa’s growing economies are likely to have economic 
structures that contain high value-added agriculture, agro-industry and tradable 
services in addition to a more robust manufacturing base. Global realities will 
force Africa’s policy makers to think of ways to promote structural 
transformation into activities beyond manufacturing.




Page 2 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Royal 
Library, Copenhagen University Library; date: 20 May 2019
While structural change is taking place in Africa, it is at a pace and with a 
pattern that is distinct from both the historical experience of today’s 
industrialized countries and from more recent transformations in East Asia. 
These differences reflect the impact of technological change and a changing 
global marketplace interacting with policy, a rapidly growing labour force, and 
natural endowments. Some African countries—perhaps those favoured by 
coastal locations—will be able to transform their economic structures through 
manufacturing. The essays in this book also suggest quite strongly, however, that 
it would be surprising if the successful African economy of the future closely 
followed the export-oriented manufacturing-led path that has characterized East 
Asia’s structural transformation. Africa’s growing economies are likely to have 
economic structures that contain high value added agriculture, agro-industry, 
and tradable services in addition to a more robust manufacturing base. New 
global realities will force Africa’s economic policy makers to think of ways to 
promote structural transformation into activities beyond manufacturing.
To transform their economies, African governments need to attract new firms 
able to compete in regional and global markets in services, tourism, and agro-
industry in addition to other manufactures. At the same time they must boost the 
competitiveness of existing firms in these same sectors. While much of the effort 
to transform the region’s economies will need to come from African governments 
themselves, the essays in Parts I and III of this book point to the crucial changes 
needed in global economic policy and in Africa’s  (p.412) regional economic 
communities (RECs). This chapter sets out new directions for public policy—at 
global, national, and regional levels—to widen the options for structural 
transformation.
2. Global Policy Reforms
The US retreat from leadership on multilateral issues, apparent since early 
2017, has created a vacuum that, left unfilled, could impede progress on 
multilateral initiatives that would otherwise promote structural change in Africa. 
The WTO negotiations on trade in agricultural products, manufactures, and e-
commerce in the Doha round were already moribund, foundering from 
complexity and multi-polar divisiveness. The new US administration immediately 
withdrew from negotiations on the Trans Pacific Partnership, a grouping of some 
twelve Pacific Rim countries. Meanwhile, across the Atlantic, the British vote to 
leave the European Union in June 2016 constituted another earthquake 
threatening a former pillar of multilateralism. For Africa, clearly, the first order 
of business is resisting the rising tide of protectionism.
2.1. Collective Action on Goods and Services Trade
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The international community can assist African governments to defend the 
global trading system by more forthrightly addressing the uneven distribution of 
gains and losses through trade. A joint publication of the World Bank, IMF, and 
WTO undertaken for the G20 Sherpas meeting in March 2017 wrote: ‘ … recent 
experience shows that too many individuals and communities, notably also in the 
advanced economies, have been left behind by trade: there are legitimate 
reasons for discontent’.1 The thrust of that report was a recommendation to 
strengthen the multilateral rules keeping markets open and to undertake serious 
country-based programs to mitigate trade adjustment costs. Of particular 
importance is portable access to health care, retirement programmes and 
education. It remains to be seen whether politicians and their societies in the 
OECD will adopt this view.
The current headwinds notwithstanding, several other global initiatives can 
support trade-led structural transformation. Reducing trade costs has an 
immediate and powerful effect on trade, and so one priority for multilateral 
collective action is to implement the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) fully. 
Ministers were able to rescue the TFA at the Bali Ministerial in 2013, and it took 
effect in February 2017, when two-thirds of the WTO membership completed  (p.
413) their individual ratification of the arrangement. The TFA includes largely 
voluntary provisions to expedite the movement, release, and clearance of goods, 
and protection of goods in transit. It also outlines ways for customs and other 
appropriate authorities to cooperate on trade facilitation and customs 
compliance, along with modalities for technical assistance and capacity building.
By reducing both the variable and fixed costs of exporting, trade facilitation 
increases the exports of those firms already involved in international trade, 
while enabling new firms to export for the first time. The WTO (2015) estimates 
that full implementation of the TFA could reduce trade costs by an average of 
14.3 per cent, and that African countries may benefit from reductions in trade 
costs in excess of 16 per cent. Full implementation of the TFA can reduce time to 
import by over a day and a half (a 47 per cent reduction over the current 
average) and time to export by almost two days (a 91 per cent reduction over the 
current average). While these estimates are necessarily sensitive to assumptions 
and model structures, they do convey the importance of agreements to reduce 
trade costs.
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Greater market access can also boost Africa’s exports. Trade policy in Africa’s 
main trading partners—especially those in Asia—has an important role to play in 
easing the entry of non-traditional African exports. Although Asia’s tariffs on 
African exports are gradually declining, the trend is weak, especially for Africa’s 
least developed countries. As Fukase and Martin argue in Chapter 5, an 
essential step is to reduce escalating tariffs directed at higher stage processing 
of commodity exports. These discourage the development of agro-industrial 
value chains. China could play a leading role here by shifting its preferential 
trading agreements with Africa from country by country bilateral deals to a 
single well publicized Africa-wide initiative. This might push its Asian trading 
partners to offer similar tariff reductions.
Unilateral preferential trade programmes such as the US Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the EU’s ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) programmes 
have contributed to an expansion of manufacturing and other exports from 
Africa. AGOA now covers forty countries, and nearly all of Africa’s exports to the 
US. Launched in 2000, it was renewed in 2015 and now extends to 2025. The 
EBA also grants duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market. As a result, as 
Fukase and Martin point out, tariffs on Africa’s exports to these major markets 
on average are less than 1 per cent, substantially less than in other markets. The 
only pall of uncertainty is the withdrawal of the UK from the EU—and with it 
prospectively the 17 per cent of the European market that it represents.
The Trade in Services Agreement (TISA), launched in 2012, may eventually have 
consequences for Africa. Negotiations are on-going and involve twenty-three 
negotiating parties, including the EU and US as well as a handful of developing 
countries (mainly from Latin America) and one African country,  (p.414) 
Mauritius. The agreement would provide access to foreign services suppliers on 
the same terms as domestic suppliers in areas such as transport, health, and 
finance. Its short-run fate, however, may be similar to other multilateral accords. 
Domestic politics in the US and Europe appears to have stalled progress.
Support for open world trade may be shifting, but not solely toward protection. 
While the US did withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement in 
early 2017, a year later in January 2018, the eleven remaining countries 
announced broad agreement on a new trade pact, christened the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Meanwhile, China, 
India, and Brazil have begun recently to play much more prominent roles in 
world trade talks, moving from participants in blocking coalitions, to new 
proponents of change. Perhaps reflecting its position as a capital exporting 
country, China has recently advocated a new ‘investment facilitation agreement’ 
that would cover foreign direct investment, and is pressing its ideas in the G20. 
India, a major exporter of services, tabled a paper on ‘services facilitation’ at the 
WTO in February 2017. While it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions, these 
actions may constitute the first steps toward a new multilateralism.
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2.2. Development Assistance and Infrastructure Finance
In the past, Official Development Assistance (ODA) was a key element promoting 
structural transformation in Africa. Infrastructure, particularly electric power, 
roads, and railways, is essential to trade-led structural transformation, and 
financing from external sources has enabled much investment of this type. After 
a slow start, the aid-for-trade initiative of the WTO has contributed to mobilizing 
additional resources for trade-related infrastructure and trade-related economic 
activities (see Lammerson and Roberts 2015). These funds have mainly gone to 
countries that are trading less than key indicators would predict and have 
contributed to positive results in trade creation (Gamberoni and Newfarmer 
2014).
In recent years, as finance through the concessional windows of the World Bank 
(the International Development Association, IDA) and other MDBs has become 
constrained, governments in Africa have mobilized new sources of finance, 
including private borrowing. Countries from Angola to Zambia have issued 
sovereign bonds. Borrowing on private markets has grown rapidly. Steady global 
market conditions and the potential for higher returns for investors have helped 
pave the way for more access to international markets, where the average 
return for these bonds is about 6.6 per cent, with an average maturity of ten 
years. Sovereign bonds and borrowings from commercial banks now amount to 
more than 40 per cent of outstanding public debt for Ghana, Senegal, and 
Zambia (Vellos 2016).
 (p.415) Because sovereign borrowing can involve high costs and short 
maturities, a better alternative would be for the international community to 
allow creditworthy countries to borrow from the non-concessional windows of 
the World Bank and other multilateral development banks. Terms are far less 
onerous—typically less than 1 per cent over Libor compared to 5–7 per cent in 
private debt markets with longer grace and repayment periods, up to 15–17 
years. Moreover, using blend financing—concessional and non-concessional loan 
packages—as well as guarantees of private lending to finance infrastructure 
would yield a higher social benefit-cost ratio than recourse to private markets 
alone (E15 2016). Greater cooperation and coordination between DAC donors 
and non-traditional donors, perhaps through the international financial 
institutions to which they both belong, could also improve the focus and 
efficiency of resource use.
3. Country-Level Strategy for Structural Transformation
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The literature on industrialization in developing countries suggests that three 
factors have largely shaped the global distribution of smokestack industry by 
attracting new investment and raising the productivity of existing firms (UNIDO 
2009; Newman et al. 2016). The first is conventionally termed the ‘investment 
climate’—the policy, institutional, and physical environment within which firms 
operate (Stern 2001, 2002). The second factor is exports. A third factor is 
agglomeration—manufacturing and services firms tend to concentrate 
geographically.
These determinants of locational choice are mutually reinforcing. Investments in 
infrastructure and skills raise the potential productivity of all firms, making 
some of them more likely to succeed in external markets. Industrial exports help 
to build firm capabilities which are then transferred through agglomeration. 
Agglomerations raise firm-level productivity. In poorer countries they also 
generate competitive pressures that reduce the incentives to cluster, unless the 
clusters are export-oriented. Thus, a strategy that encompasses each of these 
factors is critical to the success of any industrialization drive.
Because they share many firm characteristics with smokestack industries, the 
industries without smokestacks analysed in this book respond largely to the 
same drivers of locational choice. This makes it possible to sketch out a strategy 
for structural transformation that is broadly applicable to manufacturing, 
tradable services, agro-industry and horticulture. It is important to keep in mind, 
though, that each activity has unique characteristics. Generic, ‘one size fits all’ 
policy-making will be ineffective. Complementary sector specific public actions 
are also required.
 (p.416) 3.1. The Investment Climate
The investment climate has come to be broadly and somewhat vaguely defined.2
Here we focus on three areas that emerge from the essays in this volume as 
particularly relevant to industries without smokestacks—infrastructure, skills 
and competition. Reliable electrical power, lower costs of transport and workers 
better able to perform their jobs make countries more attractive to investors 
(IMF 2014). Promoting competition by reforming trade policy and domestic 
regulations can boost competitiveness.
Infrastructure
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The productivity penalty that African firms pay as a result of poor infrastructure 
and skills has been extensively documented.3 Sub-Saharan Africa lags at least 20 
percentage points behind the average for low income countries on almost all 
major infrastructure measures. In addition, the quality of service is low, supplies 
are unreliable, and disruptions are frequent and unpredictable (Newman et. al 
2016). By one estimate, the current infrastructure deficiencies in Africa 
contribute to a loss of about 2 percentage points per year in GDP growth.4
Reliable electrical power may be the greatest single issue. The quality of 
electricity service is ranked as a major problem by more than half of the firms in 
more than half of the African countries in the World Bank’s Investment Climate 
Assessments. Transport comes a close second to power across the region. Road 
infrastructure has received little attention, as until recently have the region’s 
ports.
Not surprisingly, ICT-based services may be the most sensitive to infrastructure 
constraints. As Frishtak notes in Chapter 3, backbone infrastructure is essential 
to exploit opportunities in what he characterizes as first generation IT-enabled 
services. The cases of Kenya, Rwanda, and Senegal show that high speed data 
transmission is critical to exporting a wide range of services and especially to IT-
intensive exports. Success depends on the ability to attract providers of cable 
and other links. Most African countries lack adequate backbone services 
because they went straight to mobile networks, without investing in connectivity 
first. Rwanda may be the exception; the government laid an internal backbone 
fibre optic cable throughout the country to connect virtually all regions.
A necessary condition for fully leveraging the tourism potential is to have 
adequate tourist-related infrastructure and high-quality services. Daly and 
Gereffi (see Chapter 4) point to the constraints to tourist development 
associated with air travel and road quality. Connectivity to the internet and 
communication infrastructure is also an important consideration for travellers 
 (p.417) to Africa. Such logistical challenges restrict end-market upgrading 
opportunities. The country studies indicate that quality of infrastructure 
constrains Tanzania’s and Uganda’s ability to access luxury customers. In 
Rwanda, on the other hand, a drive from Kigali, to see the mountain gorillas in 
the Volcanoes National Park takes less than three hours on well-maintained 
highways. A recent spate of airport building, serves as a reminder that it is 
important to be rigorous in the evaluation of public investments targeted at the 
tourism sector. While terminal space can run out as traffic grows, and many 
countries aspire to develop passenger or logistics hubs, neither is a rationale for 
building a new airport. Bowfinger argues in Chapter 6 that there is no shortage 
of runways in Africa, given the current traffic levels. A properly run existing 
airport will often serve the business and tourism industry, and terminals can be 
developed with private sector participation.
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Investments to improve trade logistics are essential to export success in agro-
processing and horticulture. Fukuse and Martin note that the unbundling of 
global value chains is much more demanding of logistics than traditional 
approaches to the processing of agricultural commodities. Costs associated with 
customs clearance and domestic transport may make it uneconomic for firms to 
process agricultural goods. Vulnerability to excess costs is particularly acute for 
processing activities because these frequently operate on small margins relative 
to production of traditional exports such as coffee, which frequently embody a 
large share of rents. Horticultural exports are perishable and particularly 
vulnerable to delays in shipping. As Bofinger points out, the underlying 
infrastructure in getting cut flowers to the airport is critical to success. He notes 
that Kenya’s flower-growing region is well connected by road to Kenya’s 
international airport, whereas Ethiopia’s flower-growing region in the past has 
had poor road connectivity to Bole International Airport in Addis Ababa, 
resulting in a 40 per cent spoilage rate.
Skills
Although Africans have more schooling today than in any previous generation, 
nearly 60 per cent of 15–24-year-olds have only completed primary school and 
only 19 per cent have gone beyond lower-secondary (Filmer and Fox 2014). 
Educational quality is an issue at all levels. Learning assessments in Africa show 
that most primary students lack basic proficiency in reading at the end of second 
or third grade. Employer surveys report that African tertiary graduates are weak 
in problem solving, business understanding, computer use, and communication 
skills.5 Increasing access and improving the quality of education at all levels 
remain high priorities.
 (p.418) The IT-enabled services industry is potentially constrained by its very 
source of competitive advantage. Both the Kenya and Senegal country studies 
identify the ability to hire university graduates at a fraction of the cost in Europe 
or the Arab Gulf as the initial impetus for IT-enabled startups. In Kenya attempts 
to expand the industry have rapidly encountered manpower constraints. Muchai 
and Kimuyu note in Chapter 11, for example, that an evaluation of IT skills in 
Kenya showed that there remains a substantial supply-demand gap in the high-
end talent pool in the IT workforce. There is, in particular, a lack of software 
development and project management skills. They argue that this gap is 
particularly binding in mobile money, where collaboration between the private 
sector and institutions of learning is key to ensure the skills of graduates match 
the skills required to operate mobile money transfer services.
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English notes in Chapter13 that Senegal ranks among the top fifty potential 
suppliers of outsourcing services according to the AT Kearney Global Services 
Location Index. However, it lies near the bottom—in forty-fifth place—and has 
fallen significantly in the last five years. The greatest weakness appears to be in 
the quality and quantity of human resources. English illustrates this in a case 
study of Senegal’s Premium Contact Centre International (PCCI), a major call 
centre operator. In its early days, the company faced a severe skills shortage and 
labour turnover was high due to stiff competition for skilled workers. Today, the 
entry of the large French company, Atos, into Senegal is increasing the 
competition for IT engineers.
Hoekman argues in Chapter 8 that a workforce that has the skills needed to 
interact with tourists and to provide the many ‘back office’ services that are 
inputs into the production of high-quality tourism is essential to further 
development of the industry. Lack of skills consistently emerges from the 
country studies as a constraint to higher quality tourism. Daly and Gereffi note 
in Chapter 4 that management, organization, communication, and computer 
skills are critical for tourism distribution intermediaries and service providers 
seeking to upgrade their position in the tourism value chain. While there are 
international programmes designed to teach these skills, Africa only has two 
schools that have earned certification from the UN World Tourism 
Organization’s Tedqual Programme.
Competition
Chapters 15 and 17 by Ellis, McMillan, and Silver, and Spray and Wolf, 
respectively, document large differences in productivity across firms in services 
and agro-industry.6 Similarly, Ggombe and Newfarmer calculate that many 
services sectors have productivity levels several multiples of agriculture—and 
often  (p.419) higher than manufacturing. Because productivity in services has 
an important impact on productivity levels across the economy, encouraging an 
environment where firms are compelled to search out productivity 
improvements is essential. This is where competition becomes important. It 
affects productivity through the exit of less efficient firms and the entry or 
expansion of their more efficient counterparts (Syverson 2011).
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Lack of competition in transportation markets, emphasized by de Melo et al. in 
Chapter 19 and Karingi et al. in Chapter 18, represents a significant barrier to 
integrating markets within countries and in regional groupings. Atkin and 
Donaldson (2015) show that within countries the farther a product travels from 
its source, the higher the price. This is partly because of transport costs and 
partly because of regional monopolies in distribution. Raballand et al. show in 
Chapter 7 how lack of competition is associated with higher trucking costs and 
undermines competitiveness in the EAC. Bofinger argues in Chapter 6 that the 
great majority of air transport routes in Africa are near monopolies. In East 
Africa, many services markets, notably telecommunications and finance, are 
tight oligopolies dominated by a handful of firms.
Daly and Gereffi point in Chapter 4 to an important anti-competitive aspect of 
the structure of Africa’s tourism industry. The ‘Package Booking’ distribution 
channel is particularly prominent in Africa, with foreign visitors often accessing 
safari, eco-tourism, and surf and sand products through entrenched networks of 
actors that have strong ties to one another. Lead firms assemble and package 
individual services into cohesive travel experiences. Low domestic demand for 
African tourism strengthens the position of these global lead firms because the 
entry of local tour operators is constrained by low levels of domestic demand for 
tourism. Notably, the country studies reveal that few governments have 
strategies designed to promote tourism at either the regional or national level.
These issues underscore the importance of competition policy in several 
dimensions. First, import competition—including from within regional economic 
communities—is extremely important to discipline local manufacturers and 
service providers in their pricing, investment and technology decisions. Second, 
removing barriers to foreign entry can increase competition, reduce costs and 
extend access to a broader range of differentiated services. Hoekman argues in 
Chapter 8 that FDI is a particularly important channel for the transfer of know-
how and technology, as foreign firms introduce new types of services that may 
be better suited to the needs of clients. Boefinger notes that reducing barriers to 
airline entry by adopting ‘Fifth freedom rights’ can pave the way for eventual 
competition. Third, although African countries have experienced an increase in 
competition for the provision of telecom services, efficient regulation remains 
important where a single dominant firm—as in the telecoms sector in Ethiopia or 
Senegal—effectively  (p.420) controls the price level. Finally, because it is likely 
that many companies in Africa will enjoy a degree of market power for some 
time, it is imperative that tax and investment policies encourage private 
investment so that any monopoly rents are reinvested in expanded production.
3.2. Tilting Towards Exports
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For most countries in Africa, the regional and global export market represents 
the best option for rapid growth of horticulture, agro-industry, and tradable 
services. Exports permit firms to realize economies of scale and in low-income 
countries the act of exporting raises firm productivity through learning 
(Harrison and Rodriguez-Clare 2010). Because individual firms face high fixed 
costs of entering export markets, there is a risk that countries will export too 
little unless public policies are put in place to offset the costs to first movers. To 
deal with these externalities, African governments need to develop a consistent 
package of trade and exchange rate policies, public investments, regulatory 
reforms, and institutional changes to increase the share of non-traditional 
exports in GDP.
The structure of protection and the exchange rate have an important role to play 
in ensuring that exporting is as attractive as producing for the local market. For 
this reason, proper measurement of these incentives is essential. Tariffs may 
steer investment toward production for the domestic market, and tariffs on 
intermediates and capital goods can place exporters at a disadvantage relative 
to global competitors. Fukase and Martin even suggest that high tariffs and 
other charges on intermediate inputs result in negative value added at market 
prices in some agro-processing activities, giving one possible explanation for the 
region’s lagging performance in this sector. One option to address any anti-
export bias, is to create an effective ‘free trade regime for exporters’ through 
various mechanisms to eliminate or rebate tariffs on intermediate and capital 
inputs used in export production. While duty drawback, tariff exemption and VAT 
reimbursement schemes exist in many African countries, they are often complex 
and poorly administered, resulting in substantial delays. Export procedures—
including certificates of origin, quality and sanitary certification and permits—
can be burdensome.7 One approach that has succeeded elsewhere is to 
streamline the trade regime first in special economic zones.
The exchange rate is arguably the most important price in the economy. It 
influences the relative attractiveness of producing for the domestic or foreign 
market. A competitive real exchange rate has underpinned most prolonged  (p.
421) episodes of rapid export growth, whether in Chile or China (Hausmann et 
al. 2004), and Rodrik (2008a), among others, has argued for countries at early 
stages of structural transformation to attempt to undervalue the exchange rate 
over the medium to long term. Maintaining an undervalued exchange rate is 
difficult (and costly) in countries with small bond markets and large capital 
inflows, including aid. At a minimum, macroeconomic policy should strive to 
avoid overvaluations that stifle non-traditional exports over time.8
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Trade in tasks has greatly increased the importance of trade logistics. According 
to WTO estimates, trade costs in developing countries are equivalent to applying 
a 219 per cent ad valorem tariff on international trade (WTO 2015). For this 
reason, investments in infrastructure and institutional reforms to improve trade 
logistics are essential to export success. Limao and Venables (2001), for 
example, find that an improvement in communication and transport 
infrastructure from the median score on the World Bank trade logistics index 
survey to the highest 25th percentile is associated with a decrease in transport 
costs of 12 per cent and an increase in trade volumes of 28 per cent. One study 
of port efficiency in APEC found that bringing below-average countries up to the 
APEC average level of port efficiency would produce US$117 billion in additional 
trade within APEC alone (Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki 2005).
Market structure and inappropriate regulations can also impede exports. 
Senegal provides an example of the costs to IT-based services providers of a 
monopoly controlling the price and quality of access to the backbone 
infrastructure. The high cost and limited flexibility of air transport constrains 
both horticulture and tourism. The aviation industry is heavily protected, with a 
plethora of small and uneconomic national airlines. As Bofinger points out, 
Africa is under-served by major airlines. Senegal has relied on scheduled flights 
for tourism, and with limited airline competition in its main French market, costs 
have been high. High costs of air transportation have prevented Mozambique 
and Tanzania from competing in the regional tourism market. While adopting an 
open skies policy might endanger some national airlines, it would introduce 
greater competition and reduce the cost of air freight through the development 
of competing, specialized, charter airfreight companies.
3.3. Spatial Policies
The studies of agro-processing, horticulture, and ICT-based services in this 
volume offer evidence that, like manufacturing, they benefit from agglomeration,
 (p.422) including thick labour markets, information and knowledge spill overs, 
and the ability to share overhead expenses and services. Geography also plays 
an obvious role in tourism: tourist facilities tend to cluster close to the tourism 
resource. Agglomerations pose a collective action problem: if a new location can 
attract a critical mass of firms, each firm will realize productivity gains from 
clustering. Yet, until the location reaches critical mass, there is no incentive for 
individual firms to move.
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Governments can foster agglomerations by concentrating investments in high-
quality institutions, social services, and infrastructure in a limited area, such as 
a special economic zone (SEZ) or an industrial park (UNIDO 2009; Farole 2011). 
While most first-generation SEZs have been focused on manufacturing, they are 
relevant to services and agro-based industries as well. Services export 
companies look for customized facilities such as IT parks with modern office 
space, high-speed broadband links, reliable power supply and ancillary 
infrastructure. The Software Technology Parks of India Initiative (STPI), 
launched by the Indian government to attract potential IT investors, proved 
essential to the growth of the software industry (Dongier and Sudan 2009). In 
agro-industry and horticulture, Indonesia and the Philippines have established 
agro-industrial SEZs, near growing areas to promote processed agricultural 
exports.
Most African countries are relative latecomers to the promotion of SEZs. Many 
SEZ programmes began only in the late 1990s or early 2000s. Globally, SEZs 
rarely experience rapid growth in their first 5–10 years of operation, and it may 
be too early to judge their success in Africa. In any case, evidence suggests that, 
in many countries—such as Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tanzania—zones 
are struggling (Newman and Page 2017). One reason for the lack of dynamism is 
that most African SEZs have failed to reach the levels of infrastructure and 
institutional performance needed to attract global investors.
A number of countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania are giving 
SEZs another go. Most of these countries have zones that include agriculture-
related sectors such as agri-business, agro-processing, livestock, and dairy 
products. Zones focused on high-end service sectors are less common. Some 
examples include the East London IDZ in South Africa and ITC and 
Biotechnology focused zones in Benin and Cote d’Ivoire (Newman and Page 
2017). A critical challenge will be to bring the physical, institutional and 
management quality of these zones up to a level that is sufficiently attractive to 
investors with global alternatives. In Rwanda, for example, Steenbergen and 
Javorcik (2017) have shown that firms in the SEZ in Kigali are substantially more 
productive, in part because the government offered business facilitating 
services, including more efficient import procedures.
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Spatial policies can be used to encourage the formation of value chain 
relationships. Daly and Gereffi note in Chapter 4 that underdeveloped  (p.423) 
linkages between tourism and sectors such as agriculture and construction can 
inhibit industry development and limit the economic benefits associated with 
tourism. Where foreign tour operators, hotel companies, and investors control 
supply chain decisions and procurement opportunities, linkages between 
tourism and domestic supporting industries often remain underdeveloped. In 
Senegal, English reports that a 2003 study estimated the import content of 
tourism spending at 30 per cent. The Tanzania country study suggests that 
almost 30 per cent of tourist spending leaks into foreign markets, through 
consumption of imported goods or services.
South Africa is attempting to use spatial policies to increase local participation 
in the tourism value chain. Its Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
sets guidelines for responsible sourcing—purchases that are made from 
businesses within 50 kilometres. Daly and Gereffi argue that while adherence to 
the targets has been uneven, the initiative provides a basis to address the poor 
communication and mistrust that sometimes characterize food-supply value 
chain relationships. They also suggest that national or regional investment 
departments can create databases of qualified construction contractors, sub-
contractors, and suppliers that investors can access before projects commence.
3.4. The Role of Industrial Policy
Many of the conventional public actions outlined above—the structure of 
protection, exchange rate policies, investments in trade facilitation, and reform 
of regulations—fall under the rubric of industrial policy. That is, policies 
designed to promote selected industries or activities. Perhaps no other term in 
economics has generated more heat with less light. Fortunately, industrial policy 
is finally moving away from the fruitless debates on ‘picking winners’ versus 
‘levelling the playing field’ towards the policy mainstream. There is broader 
agreement that information, learning, and geography combine to make a strong 
case for industrial policy (Stiglitz 1996, 2001; Rodrik 2008b). Arkebe Oqubay in 
a sophisticated discussion of Ethiopia’s industrial policy argues that ‘the state in 
Africa must play an activist and developmental role beyond being merely a 
“facilitating actor”; that is, being little more than a servant of comparative 
advantage’.9 The lesson he derives is that policy has to be strategically driven 
and consistent, a proposition reflected in the strategy set out above.
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 (p.424) Today many countries are integrating industrial development 
strategies that use various policy instruments into major development efforts.10
Rodrik (2004) lays out ten principles of an industrial policy for the twenty-first 
century. These include: (a) target only new activities, not sectors, and only those 
with clear potential for spillovers; (b) build in sunset clauses and feedback loops 
so mistakes can get corrected; (c) establish clear benchmarks of success; and (d) 
ensure that implementing agencies are competent and can be held accountable. 
It is important to note that few governments actually adhere to these 
principles.11
For this reason, while a strategy is essential, governments could raise the 
probability of successful results by adopting five best practices. The first is to 
avoid adopting policies that protect incumbents and restrict competition. In the 
EAC, for example, several governments are considering adopting performance 
requirements, market reservations and preferences for domestic firms in 
government procurement, among other policies, including export and import 
bans. Competition from imports is an important driver of productivity growth 
(Newfarmer and Sztajerowska 2012); competition from new entry in services 
markets can drive down prices and improve services (Hoekman and Mattoo 
2008); intra-industry competition within regions can help create larger firms 
and, by driving out marginal uncompetitive firms, raise industrial productivity 
throughout the region. Second, transparency in granting direct and indirect 
subsidies is essential to ensuring that they can be curtailed if ineffective or 
phased out when no longer needed. One option, following the New Zealand 
practice, is to report tax and other incentives as ‘tax expenditures’ or fiscal 
outlays that could be reviewed annually as part of the budget process. Third, an 
important, and often overlooked, practice is to ensure that the performance of 
firms receiving tax breaks in exchange for particular commitments, such as to 
invest or export certain amounts, is monitored adequately to ensure they 
actually fulfil their promises. Fourth, programmes designed to promote selected 
activities should incorporate periodic reviews and be evaluated against 
projected achievements. Requiring that an incentive expire unless a review 
recommends that it be extended places the burden on advocates to show why it 
remains relevant. Finally, at the outset of devising a national strategy, it is 
helpful to begin by analysing the cumulative effects on resource allocation of 
existing industrial policies. All governments have industrial policies, so 
undertaking a comprehensive review can surface activities that may be 
underserved and ones that perhaps are receiving too much public support.
 (p.425) 4. The Role of Regional Agreements
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The small size of Africa’s economies and the fact that many are landlocked make 
regional approaches to infrastructure, customs administration, and regulation of 
transport in trade corridors imperative. Moreover, neighbouring markets can 
provide the needed access and preference margins to jumpstart a wide variety of 
exports; and in an era of value chains, they offer the opportunity to develop local 
value chains that could be a spring board to the global market.
4.1. Uneven Progress Toward Deeper Integration
Ever since the Abuja Treaty was signed in 1991, African governments have 
looked to regional economic integration to expand intra-African trade, to 
harmonize regulations and policies, to establish coordinated monetary policies, 
and even to achieve political union. As de Melo et al. point out in Chapter 19, 
these goals have proven elusive. They find that reductions in tariffs and non-
tariff barriers have been implemented only slowly, that other aspects of policy 
and regulatory harmonization have lagged and that efforts to integrate in 
services trade have by and large been ignored. Growth in regional trade has 
barely kept up with exports to the rest of the world, and the introduction of new 
products in the RECs, a key indicator of export dynamism, has only accounted 
for a small percentage of trade growth.
They argue that one reason for the minimal impact of these agreements is that 
even when ambitious regulatory reform measures are enacted, they lack 
enforcement. Trade costs have come down relative to pre-agreement levels, but 
more for agriculture than for manufactures—and in only a few of the RECs. De 
Melo and his colleagues suggest that the key to unlocking more vigorous 
regional trade is to abandon the old approach of negotiating over increasing 
market access in the context of an effort to build vertically integrated regional 
value chains and instead focus on reducing trade costs and liberalizing services 
markets in order to develop horizontally organized production chains.
In Chapter 18, Karingi and others give a somewhat more upbeat interpretation 
of the effects of integration in the East African Community. They find that the 
combined share of EAC members’ intra-regional exports remained about the 
same (at 18 per cent) before and after the community was launched. That said, 
some countries gained market share—notably Uganda and, to a lesser extent, 
Burundi and Tanzania—and, together with Kenya, have benefitted from 
substantially more exports to other countries in Africa. In fact, for the EAC as a 
whole, exports to Africa outside the EAC amount to about the same share of 
exports as intra-EAC exports.
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 (p.426) Karingi et al. argue that the EAC has been a springboard for 
manufactured-, services-, and agro- exports to other parts of Africa. They note 
that intra-EAC exports are much more diversified than the community’s global 
exports. Manufactures, for example, comprise 55 per cent of intra-EAC exports 
and only 19 per cent of exports to the rest of the world. Moreover, exports of 
EAC countries to other African countries mirror the intra-EAC pattern of greater 
diversification with over half of the exports in manufactures. The authors 
showcase the dairy industry as an example where intra-EAC exports from 
Uganda have flourished—albeit behind a common external tariff of 60 per cent 
on imports.
4.2. The Way Forward: Regional Initiatives Promoting Transformation
Using the regional economic communities to propel trade integration and the 
development of regional value chains can occur through three main channels: 
reforming price incentives, strengthening trade facilitation and services 
regulation, and investing in interconnected physical infrastructure.
Reforming Price Incentives
Price incentives in Africa, despite the complex system of regional preferences, 
still tend to discourage production for the external market and inhibit the 
emergence of regional and global value chains. Karingi and his colleagues 
observe that tariffs facing exports to the rest of Africa from the EAC are 
substantially higher than to other regions and much higher than to high-income 
regions. Fukase and Martin suggest that average protection against African 
exports is 1.7 per cent in the rest of the world compared to 6.1 per cent within 
Africa itself. Tariff escalation in agriculture is particularly notable within Africa. 
Processed agricultural products are taxed on entry to other African markets at a 
rate nearly four times higher than bulk agricultural exports. Progress toward the 
Africa-wide Continental Free Trade Area, as de Melo and his colleagues note, 
could help reduce these distortions.
Regional forums and agreements can help curtail the adoption of ‘beggar thy 
neighbour’ policies that are emerging in many countries. Fiscal incentives are 
becoming an increasingly popular export promotion instrument among African 
governments. According to new data assembled by the World Bank, sub-Saharan 
Africa enacted more tax incentives to attract firms—typically multinational 
companies—to invest in export-oriented production than any other region 
between 2009 and 2015. These included tax holidays and preferential tax rates. 
Because competition among governments in granting tax incentives is intense, 
the marginal effect from an aggregate African perspective may be lost tax 
revenue with little benefit in export expansion (Von Euxkull et al. 2017).
 (p.427) Trade Facilitation and Services Regulation
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As noted above, regional institutions have already made significant progress in 
reducing trade costs. Although de Melo and others only partially attribute these 
declines to the regional agreements per se, there is little doubt that increased 
coordination has played a role. Trade costs are falling sharply—and in the EAC 
the results in terms of expanded firm level exports have been tangible (see 
Spray 2017; Karingi et al. in Chapter 18). In addition, the regional agreements 
have facilitated rapid growth in the export of transport services. Within the EAC 
transport services can amount to a sizable portion of services export earnings. In 
Uganda for example, transport services have averaged nearly 10 per cent of 
services exports in the period 2014–15 (Shepherd 2016). In Rwanda, transport 
earnings were 11 per cent of services exports in 2016 (Ggombe and Newfarmer).
Services regulation is the area where regional institutions have done the least 
and where the gains are possibly the highest. In the EAC, efforts in telecoms 
deregulation have integrated markets in long-distance services. The virtual 
elimination of roaming charges through collective regulatory action by the 
Northern Corridor countries (Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya) has lowered prices, 
expanded consumer volume, and at the same time increased firm profitability.12
Similarly, introducing a joint visa programme in the Northern Corridor countries 
has facilitated tourist travel among the three participating countries. Replicating 
these initiatives in finance, mobile money, education, and professional services, 
as well as in labour mobility generally would go far toward unleashing the 
potential for regional integration.
Investing in Interconnected Infrastructure
While interconnection of physical infrastructure is underway it could be 
accelerated. The Eastern Africa Submarine Cable System has installed some 
10,000 kilometres of fibre optic cable that links most of Eastern Africa, including 
the landlocked countries to the global internet. This effort involved the 
coordination of various governments and their telecom regulators, and its 
completion offers new access at low cost for millions of East Africans. As both 
Frischtak and Murray note in their Chapters, access to low cost, fast internet 
can be transformative.
Widening the Options
Page 19 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Royal 
Library, Copenhagen University Library; date: 20 May 2019
The development of IT infrastructure may bode well for interconnecting the 
power grid, where new installations can lower the cost of power from the 
current very high rates and improve reliability. The problems associating with 
power, however, are substantially more complex than for telecommunications. 
Road interconnections may be easier. In 2012, African ministers of 
transportation adopted a region-wide plan that included network routes,  (p.
428) design standards and harmonization of safety, social, and environmental 
norms. These should facilitate completion of the gaps in the Trans-African 
Highway. Similar efforts are underway in rail and air transportation (UNECA 
2013). The EAC’s Northern Corridor has been coordinating on a standard gauge 
railway project (US$13.5 billion) and a single airspace arrangement (All Africa 
News 2015).
5. Conclusions
The research in this book gives some good news for Africa. Structural 
transformation is taking place. In contrast to traditional historical patterns—and 
in sharp contrast to East Asia—though, the movement of labour has gone less 
into manufacturing than into services. In some countries, industries without 
smokestacks—agro-processing and horticulture, tourism, and business and 
trading services—have provided a substantial portion of new high-productivity 
jobs. At the same time, the region’s structure of trade is also changing. Although 
many countries still depend on commodity exports, Africa’s export portfolio has 
become more diversified and less concentrated than it was two decades ago. As 
a result, the region is less vulnerable to the sharp swings in commodity prices 
than at any time in its post-colonial history.
The news is not all good, however. Africa faces challenges that differ from other 
region’s historical experiences. One set of challenges is demographic. Rapid 
population growth interacting with extremely low productivity in traditional 
agriculture has led to a wave of urbanization at unprecedentedly low levels of 
average per capita income. This necessarily implies that high productivity jobs 
will be accompanied by low-productivity jobs, and the dispersion of productivity 
in cities will be large. It also means that governments have to pay as much 
attention to increasing within-sector productivity as reallocating labour into new 
sectors (Jones and Tarp 2017). Another challenge will be the changing global 
outlook and a possible retreat from multilateralism in rich countries. While 
recent forecasts point to stronger world economic growth than in most of the 
post-Great Recession period, political developments portend at least a pause in 
the trend toward greater openness and in the evolution of the rule-based system 
that provided a favourable climate for East Asia’s rapid development.
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We began this chapter by asserting that the successful African economy of the 
future will have to find its own path forward. It will, however, have transformed 
from a mainly agricultural economy into one characterized by a range of 
tradable, high value-added industries—with and without smokestacks. Policy 
changes at the global, national and regional level will be needed for that 




AEO (2013). African Economic Outlook 2013: Structural Transformation and 
Natural Resources. Paris: African Development Bank, OECD, and UNDP.
Atkin, D., and D. Donaldson (2015). ‘Who’s Getting Globalized? The Size and 
Implications of Intra-national Trade Costs’ Available at: http://dave-
donaldson.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Atkin_Donaldson_WGG_paper.pdf
(Accessed in April 2017). Mimeo.
Clarke, G. R. G. (2005). ‘Beyond Tariffs, and Quotas: Why Don’t African Firms 
Export More?’ Policy Research Working Paper 4317. Washington DC: World 
Bank.
Dongier, P., and R. Sudan (2009). Information and Communications for 
Development. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Eichengreen, B. (2008). ‘The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth’. 
Commission on Growth and Development Working Paper 4. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
English, P., P. McSharry, and K. Ggombe (2016). ‘Raising Exports and Attracting 
FDI in Rwanda’. IGC Policy Note 38402. London: International Growth Centre.
Escribano, A., J. L. Guasch, and J. Pena (2010). ‘Assessing the Impact of 
Infrastructure Quality of Firm Productivity in Africa: Cross-Country Comparisons 
Based on Investment Climate Surveys from 1999–2005’. Policy Research 
Working Paper 5191. Washington DC: World Bank.
Farole, T. (2011). Special Economic Zones in Africa: Comparing Performance and 
Learning from Experience. Washington DC: World Bank.
Filmer, D., and L. Fox (2014). Youth Employment in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Washington DC: World Bank.
Gamberoni, E., and R. Newfarmer (2014). ‘Aid for Trade: Do Those Countries 
that Need It, Get It?’. The World Economy, 37(4).
Widening the Options
Page 21 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Royal 
Library, Copenhagen University Library; date: 20 May 2019
Harrison, A., and A. Rodriguez-Clare (2010). ‘Foreign Investment, and Industrial 
Policy for Developing Countries’. In D. Rodrik and M. Rosenzweig (eds), 
Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 5. The Netherlands: North Holland.
Hausmann, R., L. Pritchett, and D. Rodrik (2004). ‘Growth Accelerations’. NBER 
Working Paper 10566. Cambridge: NBER.
Hoekman, B., and A. Mattoo (2008). ‘Services, Trade and Growth’. Policy 
Research Working Paper 4461. The World Bank.
IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization (2017). Making Trade an Engine 
of Growth for All: The Case for Trade and for Policies to Facilitate Adjustment. 
Washington DC: IMF.
Jones, S., and F. Tarp (2017). ‘Mozambique: Jobs and Welfare in and Agrarian 
Economy’ in G. Betcheman and M. Rama (eds), Jobs for Development: 
Challenges and Solutions in Different Country Settings. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Lammersen, F., and M. Roberts (2015). ‘Aid for Trade 10 Years On: Keeping it 
Effective’. OECD Development Policy Papers 1, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jrqc6q4xxr5-en (Accessed in April 2017).
Limão, N. and A. J. Venables (2001). ‘Infrastructure, Geographical Disadvantage, 
Transport Costs, and Trade’. World Bank Economic Review. Washington, DC: 
World Bank.
NEPAD, AU, and AfDB (2011). ‘The Programme for Infrastructure Development 
in Africa: Transforming Africa through Modern Infrastructure’ Johannesburg: 
NEPAD.
 (p.430) Newfarmer, R., and M. Szrtajerowska (2012). ‘Trade and Employment 
in Fast-Changing World’. In D. Lippoldt (ed.), Policy Priorities for International 
Trade and Jobs. Paris: OECD.
Newman, C., and J. Page (2017). ‘Industrial Clusters: The Case for Special 
Economic Zones in Africa’. WIDER Working Paper 15/2017. Helsinki: UNU-
WIDER.
Newman, C., J. Page, J. Rand, A. Shimeles, M. Soderbom, and F. Tarp (2016). 
Made in Africa: Learning to Compete in Industry. Washington DC: Brookings 
Institution Press.
Oqubay, A. (2015). Made in Africa: Industrial Policy in Ethiopia. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Widening the Options
Page 22 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Royal 
Library, Copenhagen University Library; date: 20 May 2019
Page, J., and A. Shimeles (2015). ‘Aid, Employment and Poverty Reduction in 
Africa’. Africa Development Review, 27(S1): 17–30.
Page, J., and F. Tarp (2017). The Practice of Industrial Policy: Business 
Government Relations in Africa and Emerging Asia. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.
Rodrik, D. (2004). ‘Industrial Policy for the 21st Century’. CEPR Discussion
Paper 4767. London: CEPR.
Rodrik, D. (2008a). ‘The Real Exchange Rate and Economic Growth’. (Harvard 
University). Available at http://j.mp/1gN5Tx8. (Accessed in April 2017).
Rodrik, D. (2008b). ‘Normalizing Industrial Policy’. Paper prepared for the 
Commission on Growth and Development. Washington DC: World Bank.
Shepherd, B. (2016). ‘Uganda Improving Export Performance’. IGC Policy Paper
F-38213-UGA-1 London: International Growth Centre.
Spray, J. (2017). ‘Trade Costs and Industrial Policy in Uganda and Rwanda’. 
Presentation to conferences in Kampala and Kigali, respectively, 23–28 March 
2017. Mimeo.
Steenbergen, V., and B. Javorcik (2017). ‘Analysing the Impact of the Kigali 
Special Economic Zone on Firm Behaviour’. IGC Working Paper F-38419-RWA-1 
London: International Growth Centre.
Stern, N. (2001). A Strategy for Development. Beijing: China People’s University.
Stern, N. (2002). The Investment Climate, Governance, and Inclusion in 
Bangladesh. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Stiglitz, J. E. (1996). ‘Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle’. World Bank 
Research Observer, 11(2): 151–77.
Stiglitz, J. E. (2001). ‘From Miracle to Crisis to Recovery: Lessons from Four 
Decades of East Asian Experience’. In J. E. Stiglitz and S. Yusef (eds), Rethinking 
the East Asian Miracle. Washington DC: World Bank.
Syverson, C. (2011). ‘What Determines Productivity’. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 49(2): 326–65.
UNECA (2013). Harmonizing Policies to Transform the Trading Environment.
Addis Ababa: UNECA.
UNIDO (2009). Industrial Development Report 2009. Vienna: United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization.
Widening the Options
Page 23 of 24
PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All 
Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a 
monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: Royal 
Library, Copenhagen University Library; date: 20 May 2019
Vellos, R. (2016). ‘Sub-Saharan Africa Sovereign Bond Issuance Boom’. Blog. 
Available at: http://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/print/sub-saharan-africa-s-
sovereign-bond-issuance-boom (Accessed in April 2017).
Von Uexkull, E., M. Reinholdt, and B. Kett (2017). ‘Tax incentives and FDI in 
Low- and Middle-Income Countries’. Draft Chapter for Global Investment 
Competitiveness Report. Washington DC: World Bank, forthcoming.
 (p.431) Wilson, J. S., C. Mann, and T. Otsuki (2005). ‘Assessing the Potential 
Benefit of Trade Facilitation: A Global Perspective’. The World Economy, 28(6).
World Bank (2007). Expanding the Possible in Sub-Saharan Africa: How Tertiary 
Institutions Can Increase Growth and Competitiveness. Washington DC: World 
Bank.
WTO (2015). World Trade Report 2015: Speeding Up Trade—Benefits and 
Challenges of Implementing the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement. Geneva: 
World Trade Organization.
Yoshino, Y. (2008). ‘Domestic Constraints, Firm Characteristics, and 
Geographical Diversification of Firm-Level Manufacturing Exports in Africa’. 
Policy Research Working Paper 4575. Washington DC: World Bank. (p.432)
Notes:
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